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A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF UPGRADES TO NAVAL AND AIR 
FORCE AIRCRAFT TO IDENTIFY SIMILARITIES AND TRENDS 






This project examines the upgrades to U.S. Navy F/A-18 and Air Force F-16 aircraft, 
both of which are Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). Timelines are 
examined to illustrate when the various platform upgrades were requested via the 
presidential budget. The types of upgrades are noted and reviewed to capture which 
upgrades were pursued on what airframes within each type/model/series of aircraft.  As a 
result of this project, the USD(AT&L) will have a foundation upon which further 
research may build to better discern whether there is an optimal interval between 
modifications. 
The intent of this project is not to determine whether the time-phased 
implementation of upgrades is feasible, but rather to identify similarities and capture any 
trends in various upgrades. The goal of this project is twofold: first, to provide a 
summary review of upgrades to U.S. Navy and Air Force aircraft, and second, to 
investigate the opportunity for any follow-on studies of additional MDAP 
modifications/block upgrades. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) detailed that the 
Department of Defense (DoD) has on its books 96 Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs), which collectively exceed $1.5 trillion (GAO, 2012).  The goal of each 
program, in the most basic of terms, is to provide the warfighter with increased capability 
as soon as possible while carefully balancing cost, performance, and schedule.     
Whether executing the acquisition of Automated Information Systems (AISs), munitions, 
aircraft, ships, or ground vehicles, some programs are better poised to deliver 
requirements more rapidly than others through implementation of an evolutionary 
acquisition (EA) strategy.  While some platforms (e.g., a single aircraft carrier) are 
limited to delivering their full capability only upon completion of the entire program, 
larger quantity programs that rely on the production of multiple units have the luxury of 
pursuing EA.  By accepting a product that meets a majority of desired requirements, the 
warfighter may take advantage of increased capability sooner with the assurance that 
follow-on production models will continue to build upon what has already been 
delivered.  Ultimately, the warfighter will have all requirements met while all along 
having had the advantage of the infamous but beneficial “80% solution.”  This time-
phased systems improvement approach is typically referred to as block upgrades. 
It is common practice for DoD program managers of major weapon systems to 
implement one or more block upgrades some time during the life cycle of their respective 
platforms. Each block upgrade is a dedicated effort that may incorporate a major design 
change, in terms of either hardware or software, which allows the fleet to receive 
enhanced capability via incremental delivery.  It is quite possible that after multiple 
iterations, the end product is significantly different from the original. To that end, one 
may question the delineation between a “block upgrade” and a “new project,” a topic that 
warrants its own study.  Because DoD acquisition policy is very focused on controlling 
life-cycle costs, a modification to achieve greater capability as an alternative to an 
entirely new platform is an option that is always considered when addressing capability 
gaps.  However, more often than not, new starts come with a hefty and perhaps 
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prohibitive financial price tag along with a potentially very detailed and lengthy 
developmental timeline. Considering the DoD’s ever-changing operating environments 
and missions in support of national defense and worldwide peacekeeping initiatives, the 
use of block upgrades offers an attainable path forward for many key weapon systems in 
order to increase capabilities, prolong service life, and ensure operational availability of 
the assets. 
The objective of this project is to identify and examine the time-phased upgrades 
to U.S. Navy F/A-18 and Air Force F-16 aircraft, each of which is an MDAP.  I examine 
timelines to illustrate when the various platform upgrades were requested via the 
Presidential budget for each of the two aircraft.  As a result of this project, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) will be 
able to conduct further research to determine an optimal interval between modifications.  
To be clear, the intent of this project is not so much to determine whether the time-phased 
implementation of upgrades is feasible or efficient, but rather to identify similarities and 
capture any trends in the various upgrades implemented within the F/A-18 and F-16 
programs. 
Following a literature review of GAO reports, Congressional Research Service 
publications, and published articles that capture various perspectives on evolutionary 
acquisition and its implementation, I provide a brief overview of each of the platforms 
investigated for this project.  I then describe my methodology for this research and 
analyze the data I collected.  Lastly, I present a summary of conclusions and 
recommendations for additional research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is no debating the validity of EA.  The benefits are understood and 
appreciated, and DoD regulation has formally incorporated EA for nearly 10 years in 
DoD Directive 5000.01 (DoD, 2007a).  Although the term “spiral development” has 
come and gone out of favor, the preference for time-phased incremental improvements 
remains firmly rooted in The Defense Acquisition System.  
In this literature review, I focus on publications that offer insight into the 
feasibility of and reliance on EA in support of MDAPs.  I also focus on capturing (at the 
most basic level) a trend analysis of aviation-centric upgrades, for which there are 
currently no published articles on this topic. Therefore, as a starting point, the literature 
captured here details the DoD’s preference of EA as a means of delivering the most 
capability efficiently to the warfighters.   
The practice of a systematic, step-wise acquisition process that delivered products 
sooner made its DoD debut in the mid-1990s, and by 2001 it was formally adopted as a 
default weapon system development method (along with spiral development, which later fell 
out of favor by lack of mention in the 2005 version of DoD 5000.1).  Fiscal year (FY) 2003 
saw the Department of Defense Authorization Act (S. 2515), which called upon the DoD to 
detail how it planned to ensure incorporation of EA.  A year later, H.R. 1588 (National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004) reinforced the DoD program managers’ 
expectations by requesting that the GAO assess three concerns:  whether current policies 
supported EA, whether the intent of the policy was assured by various controls that were in 
place, and whether the EA policy adequately addressed the concerns of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee.  In 2007, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 
5122) required the DoD to review and further refine current acquisition policies based on 
greater incorporation of EA (a.k.a., incremental acquisition). 
At the start, members of Congress raised concerns as the DoD tried to shift from 
the paradigm of a single step to full capability (SSFC) acquisition process to that of 
evolutionary acquisition (EA).  The SSFC method relies heavily on successful and 
accurate long-range forecasting.  Ironically, any forecasting beyond the first few fiscal 
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years of any well-laid government acquisition plan tends to become very unreliable for a 
variety of reasons. With a shift from SSFC to EA, congressional committees expressed 
concern over the possibility of decreased oversight, and how the step-wise process would 
impact current regular reporting periods (Gertler, 2009).  Moreover, evolutionary 
acquisition requires a great deal of trust from all players:  first and foremost, trust from 
the user who agrees to accept earlier-delivered products that are essentially 80% 
solutions; second, from the program managers and their respective PMOs that their 
tireless efforts for development and delivery will bear  top priority; and third, from the 
various members of Congress and the DoD acquisition force that clear, concise, and 
accurate updates will be provided by the cognizant program managers.  This 
interdependent triad of trust (see Figure1) is a basis for the motivation to invest the 
resources (people, time, and money) necessary to establish the acquisition building 
blocks for the time-phased completion and delivery of a product.  
 
Figure 1.   The EA Interdependent Triad of Trust 
A. MASTER PLANS AND ROADMAPS 
EA serves as a method for the DoD to achieve the end goals detailed in various 
master plans and roadmaps.  Whether it is the Naval Aviation Vision (Babb, 2012), The 
Air Force Roadmap 2006-2025 (Department of the Air Force, 2006), or The DoD 
FY2009–2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap (DoD, 2006), the underlying 
principle is constant improvement over several years in an incremental fashion. 
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An effective fighting force at its very root is also an efficient fighting force.  To 
that end, the Navy set out to streamline its helicopter fleet by taking a fleet of nine types 
of helicopters composed of four unique airframes to a fleet of three types of Sikorsky-
manufactured helicopters, the MH-60R, MH-60S, and MH-53E.  Ultimately, the MH-
53E would be replaced by the MH-60S, enabling the Navy to operate a fleet of common 
helicopters (Babb, 2012).  The support and control of logistics, maintenance, and 
operation of a single airframe are only possible via the methodical implementation of 
upgrades that allow for multi-mission configurations, which are possible only through 
step-wise capability improvements. 
Even before the formal adoption of the term EA, the Tactical Air Command 
(TAC), a subset of the Air Force, developed a strategy to reshape the various air wings 
and squadrons through the incorporation of new aircraft, including the Advanced Tactical 
Fighter and the A-16, the latter of which never materialized (Department of the Air 
Force, 2006).  The basis for the plan’s success was incremental, time-phased capability 
enhancement. No other means were feasible.  The dollar cost alone for the structured 
force change would be challenging.  In addition, the resources to establish enough 
manufacturing capability to instantly produce the desired end product in a matter of a few 
years would have been prohibitive.  This combination perfectly underscores that EA is 
the only viable path forward to deliver capable assets while simultaneously positioning 
the DoD to more readily incorporate technology as it becomes available. 
Another example is the DoD’s roadmaps for unmanned systems (DoD, 2006, 
2007a).  There is an effort to greatly enhance and more readily take advantage of the 
unmanned systems by providing the following war fighting capabilities: 
• reconnaissance and surveillance; 
• target identification and designation; 
• counter-mine and explosive ordnance disposal; and 
• chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) reconnaissance. 
However, the technology that will allow for success in some of the intended missions has 
yet to be proven or demonstrated.  In order to draft a path forward, the authors of the 
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capability plan first had to evaluate the collective position of the DoD’s autonomous 
technology, and then determine how to achieve the capability within the air, ground, and 
maritime domains.  Table 1 identifies enabling technology in terms of what is available 
versus what is required.  EA is a strategy to incorporate what has yet to be developed.  
 
Table 1.    Technology Available Now Versus Technology Required for Autonomous 
Capabilities (From DoD, 2006) 
B. MODERNIZATION ISSUES 
A 2007 GAO report states, “During the next 7 years, the military services plan to 
spend about $109.3 billion to acquire about 570 new tactical aircraft and to modernize 
hundreds of operational aircraft.”  (GAO, 2007, p.2) 
Aircraft modernization includes the following issues (see Figure 2): required versus 
actual operational availability (OA) of assets, the ability to counter projected threats, and 
industry’s capability to provide production support.  In terms of OA, service chiefs rely on 
various squadron representatives and requirements officers to provide accurate assumptions 
regarding expected service life and what is required to safely and effectively extend the 
service life.  An integral part of those assumptions is the predicted threat assessments, 
which are based on a combination of actual and predicted threat levels together with any 
relief provided by the delivery of pending new airframes.  Specifically, F-16 modernization 
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efforts have been tempered by the expectation of a growing F-22 fleet, and the F/A-18 
upgrades are balanced with the progress of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 
 
Figure 2.   Aircraft Modernization Considerations (From GAO, 2001b) 
Cost is also a factor.  When accounting for costs, assessment teams need to 
evaluate previous trends in terms of maintenance, logistics, and training.  Projections of 
future expenditures must also account for an increase in the frequency of repairs as well 
as upgrades required to meet safety standards (i.e., compliance with new FAA 
regulations), for the ability to minimize or eliminate capability gaps, and for any increase 
in cost/price as impacted by a shifting industrial base.  Specifically, the further a T/M/S 
of aircraft moves beyond full-rate production, the less available spare parts become since 
tooling, templates, and processes are retired or realigned to other products.  The GAO 
highlights the relationship between purchasing new airframes and maintaining legacy 
assets:  “If quantities of new aircraft are reduced and/or deliveries slip further into future 
years, significantly more (as yet) unplanned money will be required to sustain, 
modernize, and extend the life of legacy systems to ensure that the total force is both 
capable and sufficient in numbers.” (GAO, 2007,p.2) The GAO further adds that attempts 
to effectively plan for and implement modernization projects are stymied by the 
challenge of accurately predicting the costs associated with new development and 
production. 
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Our nation’s success in establishing its collective defensive posture is in large part 
due to the ability of industry to produce the war fighting assets required.  A 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) report (Gertler, 2009) focuses on the diligence 
that must be afforded in terms of maintaining production capability, tooling, and 
knowledge to mitigate the risk of undermining the ability to maintain a superior air force.  
But this concern may be juxtaposed against the argument that we can recapitalize on the 
tooling required to more readily support current in-service aircraft to a higher degree.   
Summarizing section 1047 of H.R. 2647 (National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2010) as passed by the House, the House Armed Services Committee in a 
2009 report detailed the emphasis given to aircraft upgrades/modifications by stating, 
The committee has identified $143.7 million in unjustified program 
growth in the Air Force operation and maintenance administrative budget, 
specifically service-wide technical support, service-wide administration, 
and service-wide other activities. Additionally, the committee has 
identified $200.9 million in unexecutable peacetime operations due to 
deployments in the Air Force operating forces, air operations budget 
activity. The committee recommends that these funds totaling $344.6 be 
used for the continued operation and maintenance of the 249 legacy 
fighters that were slated for retirement during fiscal year 2010 until such 
time as the reporting requirement above is met. In addition, the committee 
recommends that $10.5 million of funds for aircraft procurement be 
available for obligations for modifications necessary to sustain the 249 
fighter aircraft. (Gertler, 2009, p.17) 
In summary, the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act authorized 
approximately $42,000 for each of the 249 USAF fighters to be modified. 
In 2001, Allen Li (GAO, 2001b), the director of acquisition and sourcing 
management, wrote a letter to the Secretary of Defense to introduce GAO Report 01-163 
supported by Table 2.  In the letter he stated,  
We project that in 2011, the average age of the Air Force’s tactical aircraft will 
grow from 13 to 21 years; for the Navy, it will increase from 10 to 11 years. By 
2025, we project that the average age of Navy aircraft will be about 10 years but 
that Air Force aircraft will have an average age of 16 years…We also observed 
that DOD and the services’ approved financial plans for 2001 and future years do 
not include funding for structural modifications that the services believe are 
essential for maintaining certain tactical aircraft in the force. These modifications, 
estimated to cost about $1,344 million through fiscal year 2014, are necessary, 
according to the Navy and the Air Force, to extend the useful lives of about 1,542 
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F/A-18C/D and F-16 aircraft. These modifications are essential for DOD to 
maintain sufficient numbers of tactical aircraft to respond to the current defense 
policy to fight in two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. 
 
 
Table 2.   Examples of Average Aircraft Age and Expected Life (From GAO, 2001b) 
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III. OVERVIEW OF THE F/A-18 HORNET, F-16 FIGHTING 
FALCON, AND ASSOCIATED UPGRADES 
A. F/A-18 HORNET 
In 2009, there were 1,000 F/A-18s in the Naval inventory (GAO, 2010).  The 
F/A-18 Hornet got its start in the latter half of the 1970s with the A/B series.  Full-rate 
production was authorized in 1975 and the fleet had initial operational capability (IOC) in 
January 1983.  The C/D series followed shortly thereafter with IOC 1987, and, by mid-
FY1994, there was a critical design review for the E/F model.  The first flight for the 
F/A-18 E/F was in 1997, and it has since come to be operated by the following seven 
nations, in addition to the United States: Australia, Canada, Finland, Kuwait, Malaysia, 
Spain, and Switzerland.  Since its inception, there have been four major block upgrades.  
Regarding the time phasing between block upgrades for the F/A-18 A/B/C/D/E/F, there is 
little systematic correlation other than adherence to a predefined plan in support of the 
Naval Aviation Vision (Babb, 2012).  Figure 3 illustrates the block-wise progression of 
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Figure 3.   F/A-18 Block Progression History (From Helper, 2009) 
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B. F-16 FIGHTING FALCON 
In 2009, there were 1,200 F-16s in the Air Force inventory (GAO, 2010).  First 
reaching IOC in 1979, the Fighting Falcon was upgraded in 1981 to the C/D model (a.k.a., 
block 25/32), then in 1989 to blocks 40/42.  In 1994, the F-16 block 50/52 became 
operational.  There was a two-, seven-, and five-year gap, respectively, between the various 
upgrades.  The Air Force continues to upgrade the F-16 in order to increase capability and 
extend its service life through the end of FY2025.  Figure 4 depicts a planned decrease in 
the quantity of F-16s as EA is expected to impact its efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Projection of Aircraft Quantity Required Through FY2025 
(From GAO, 2007) 
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS 
This research relied on information reported annually to Congress as per the 
various submissions in support of the presidents’ budget submission to Congress.  By 
using the Defense Acquisition Management Information Repository (DAMIR), the Air 
Force Financial Management & Comptroller website (http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil 
/budget/index.asp), and the Department of Navy Budget Materials website 
(http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/fmb/13pres/books.htm), I was able to access the 
archived budget materials from FY1998 through FY2013 for the Navy and Air Force.  
Specifically, I focused on the records that capture Aircraft Procurement, Navy (APN) and 
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force (APAF).  Table 3 lists the volumes of the seven budget 
activities (BAs) within the DoD. 
 
Budget 
Activity   Title 
BA-1.         Combat Aircraft 
BA-2.         Airlift Aircraft 
BA-3.         Trainer Aircraft 
BA-4.         Other Aircraft 
BA-5.         Modification of In-Service  
                    Aircraft 
BA-6.         Aircraft Spares and Repair  
                    Parts 
BA-7.         Aircraft Support  
                    Equipment & Facilities 
Table 3.   Budget Activities, APN and APAF Budget Documentation (From Roberts, 
2011) 
I paid particular attention to the justification of estimates detailed in the B-5 
budget activities for the modification of in-service aircraft. 
Table 4 details a subset of Navy aircraft procurement categories. The Navy uses a 
combination of the acronym for Aircraft Procurement, Navy (APN) and the number of 
the corresponding budget activity (1–7) to yield terms APN-1 through APN-7.  
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Navy Procurement Categories Description 
Aircraft Procurement, Navy 1  (APN-1) Provides for fabricating and procuring 
combat aircraft 
Aircraft Procurement, Navy 5  (APN-5) Provides for modifications of aircraft 
Aircraft Procurement, Navy 6  (APN-6) Provides for aircraft spares and repair parts  
Aircraft Procurement, Navy 7  (APN-7) Provides for  aircraft support equipment 
and facilities  
Table 4.   Navy Procurement Categories (From Roberts, 2011) 
The Air Force references uniquely numbered Budget Programs (BP), with each 
number identifying what the funds are intended to procure (see Table 5). 
USAF Budget Programs Description 
Budget Program 10 (BP-10) Provides for fabricating and procuring 
complete aircraft 
Budget Program 11 (BP-11) Provides for permanent modifications of in-
service aircraft 
Budget Program 12 (BP-12) 
Provides for replacement of organizational- 
and intermediate-level support equipment 
(common and peculiar) for all out-of-
production aircraft 
Budget Program 13 (BP-13) 
Provides for post-production costs in support 
of the following: 
(1) production-line close-down costs,  
(2) deferred support equipment  
(3) interim contractor support (until the date 
specified in the acquisition program 
baseline), and  
(4) procurement-related contractor support 
Budget Program 16 (BP-16) 
Provides for procuring investment-type 
initial spares and repair parts 
Table 5.   USAF Budget Programs (From AFMAN 65-604, 2012) 
For both the Air Force and the Navy, the budget submissions included details and 
justification in support of all aircraft appropriations, but in this project, I honed in on the 
data captured specifically within Air Force BP-11 and Navy APN-5 because they are 
both intended to capture modifications.  I specifically avoided inclusion of APN-1 and/or 
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BP-10 because the intent of those categories is to capture the procurement of production-
line aircraft.  This paper has a narrow focus on retrofit of post-production aircraft. 
Further narrowing the focus, I considered only Air Force F-16s and Navy F/A-
18s.  It is important to highlight that U.S. Marine Corps F/A-18 are captured as a subset 
of the Department of the Navy (DoN).  I determined the specific Navy and Air Force 
aircraft by noting which aircraft were prominent within budget activity-5 between fiscal 
years 1997 and 2013.  The intent was to capture aircraft that are now, in some capacity, 
being modified versus simply produced.  After reviewing the data, I discovered numerous 
variations of the same airframe, which indicate the DoD’s attempt to provide specialized 
platforms for mission-specific tasking.  For the sake of the paper, I have identified the 
baseline model of each aircraft and then followed each subsequent variation as a 
capability-enhancing upgrade.  This is a very important point that bears repeating.  If an 
airframe does not include the phrase Block I or Block II, I did not necessarily discount it 
from my list of observable data. 
To discern which updates were funded (not necessarily completed), I used the 
data captured in two unique budget forms, P-40 and P-3a, both of which support the P-1.  
The P-1 is an overarching summary form that captures (at the Service component level) 
the line item procurement request for each appropriation within the Presidential budget 
request.  The P-40 details each line item captured within the P-1 that is equal to or in 
excess of $5 million.  Likewise, the supporting documentation for each individual 




Figure 5.   P-Form Flow Chart (From Roberts, 2011) 
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A. F-16 TRENDS IN UPGRADES 
Between FY1998 and FY2013, the F-16 program cited 28 unique efforts that were 
either supporting or central to a capability improvement.  Table 6 depicts the number of 
times these 28 unique efforts were requested by the F-16 program over a 15-year span 
(1998–2013) of the Presidential budget submissions.  Nine of the upgrade modifications 
were budgeted for a period of eight or more years during the 16-year timeframe that I 
investigated.  The efforts that consistently requested funding were Global Positioning 
System (GPS; 13 years), Modular Mission Computer (12 years), and Smart Weapons 







13 Global Positioning System 
12 Modular Mission Computer 
12 Smart Weapons Support Infrastructure 
11 Color Displays 
11 Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System 
11 Link 16 
10 F110 Digital Engine Control 
9 Air-to-Air Interrogator 
8 Mode 5 Identification 
7 ALE-47 Auto/Semi-Auto & Chaff and Flare System 
6 ALQ-213 Countermeasure Set 
6 Falcon 229 Engine Upgrade 
6 Improved Data Modem 
6 Night Vision Imaging System 
4 Beyond Line-of-Sight Radio 
4 Commercial Central Interface Unit 
4 Enhanced Fire Control Computer 
4 Tactical Data Link 
3 600-Gallon External Fuel Tanks 
3 Advanced Data Transfer Equipment 
3 Advanced Interrogator, Friend/Foe (IFF) 
3 ALR-56M RCPU Upgrade 
3 Digital Flight Control Computer 
3 Secure Line-of-Sight Radio 
2 Color Airborne Video Tape Recording System 
2 Commercial Flight Control Computer 
1 Main Aircraft Battery 
1 Radar Warning Receiver Update 
Table 6.   Number of Air Force Budget Requests Across Presidents’ Budgets, 
FY1998–FY2013 
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Of the 28 efforts, two were budgeted to impact all blocks of the F-16 
(25/30/32/40/42/50/52) and were submitted in FY1998 and then again in FY2007 
(see Table 7). 
Blocks Effort Budget Year 
25/30/32/40/42/50/52 
Night Vision Imaging 
System 1998 
25/30/32/40/42/50/52 Secure Line-of-Sight Radio 2007 
Table 7.   Efforts Spanning all Blocks FY1998–FY2013 
Nine efforts captured the earlier blocks (25/30/32) within the budget requests for 
FY1998, FY1999, FY2000, FY2003, FY2005, and FY2007 (see Table 8). 
Blocks Effort Budget Year 
25/30/32 ALQ-213 Countermeasure Set 1998 
25/30/32 GPS 1998 
25/30/32 Night Vision Imaging System 1998 
25/30/32 Smart Weapons Support Infrastructure 1998 
25/30/32 Enhanced Fire Control Computer 1999 
25/30/32 Main Aircraft Battery 2000 
25/30/32 Commercial Central Interface Unit 2003 
25/30/32 Color Displays 2005 
25/30/32 Secure Line-of-Sight Radio 2007 
Table 8.   Efforts Focusing on Blocks 25/30/32 
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Twelve efforts targeted all of the mid-block aircraft (40/42/50/52) and were 
included in FY1998, FY2000, FY2001, FY2003, FY2006, and FY2008 (see Table 9). 
Blocks Effort Budget Year 
40/42/50/52 ALE-47 Auto/Semi-Auto & Chaff System 1997 
40/42/50/52 Smart Weapons Support Infrastructure 1998 
40/42/50/52 ALR-56M RCPU Upgrade 2000 
40/42/50/52 Color Displays 2001 
40/42/50/52 Link 16 2001 
40/42/50/52 Modular Mission Computer 2001 
40/42/50/52 Tactical Data Link 2003 
40/42/50/52 GPS 2006 
40/42/50/52 Mode 5 Identification 2006 
40/42/50/52 Advanced Data Transfer Equipment 2008 
40/42/50/52 Digital Flight Control Computer 2008 
40/42/50/52 Beyond Line-of-Sight Radio 2009 
Table 9.   Efforts Focusing on Blocks 40/42/50/52 
The latter-most blocks (50/52) were captured by requests in FY1998, FY1999, 
FY2000, and then again in FY2010 (see Table 10). 
Blocks Effort Budget Year 
50 600-Gallon External Fuel Tanks 1998 
50/52 Color Displays 1999 
50/52 Link 16 1999 
50/52 Air-to-Air Interrogator 2000 
50/52 
Color Airborne Video Tape Recording 
System 2000 
50/52 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System 2000 
50/52 Modular Mission Computer 2000 
50/52 Mode 5 Identification 2010 
Table 10.   Efforts Focusing on Blocks 50/52 
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Figure 6 graphically depicts the top six recurring modification requests in terms of 
number of times requested over the period of time included in my research (FY1998–
FY2013).  Tables 11 and 12 provide additional insight into the annual budget requests, 




Figure 6.   Top Six Recurring F-16 Modification Requests 
Note:  During the research for this project, budget activity-5 for the USAF FY2004 budget was not available.  This is the reason for 
the one-year break in continuity. 
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Table 11.   BP-11 Modification Request Data From FY 1998 to FY 2013 (Part 1 of 2) 
Note:  During the research for this project, budget activity-5 for the USAF FY2004 budget was not available.  This is the reason for 
the one-year break in continuity. 
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Table 12.   BP-11 Modification Request Data From FY 1998 to FY 2013 (Part 2 of 2) 
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Figure 7 shows the trend of costs associated with the USAF budget requests for 
modifications and procurement.  Specifically, there are two trend lines depicted.  The lower 
curve shows the costs for F-16 modifications as a percentage of the total cost of all USAF 
aircraft modifications.  The graph depicts a decreasing trend since FY2005 for costs of 
modifying the F-16.  The upper curve shows the cost of all USAF aircraft modifications as 
a percentage of the entire USAF aircraft procurement budget.  In contrast to the former 
trend, here we notice an increase in overall modification costs since FY2005. 
 
Figure 7.   Trends in Air Force Modification Costs 
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B. F-18 TRENDS IN UPGRADES 
The F-18 program has introduced several variants of the aircraft that benefited 
from the EA strategy.  From FY1998 through FY2013, 24 distinct efforts were essential 
for aircraft modernization and overall mission success (see Table 13).   Of the 24 unique 
efforts, 14 were included in the Presidential budget request for eight or more years within 
the 15-year research window of this project.  Two of the efforts (a digital 
communications system and a multifunctional information distribution system) received 
funding for 15 consecutive years.  The next four largest annual inclusions were avionics 
upgrades for the U.S. Marine Corps (14 consecutive years); a positive identification 
system (13 years); a joint helmet-mounted cueing system (13 consecutive years); and 
advanced targeting, forward-looking infrared (ATFLIR; 13 consecutive years).
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Number of Years 
Captured in Presidents’ 
Budgets, FY1998–
FY2013 Effort 
15 Digital Communications System 
15 Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) 
14 U.S. Marine Corps Avionics Upgrade 
13 Positive ID System 
13 Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System 
13 ATFLIR 
11 GPS 
10 Air Intercept Missile (AIM)-9X Compatibility 
9 Common Configuration 
9 AN/APG-73 Radar Upgrade 
9 AN/ARC-210 Electronic Protection Comb Radio 
9 NACES Ejection Seat 
8 Advanced Tactical Airborne Recon System 
8 Core Avionics Upgrades 
6 Link 4A Replacement 
5 Mk XIIA Mode 5 IFF 
5 Litening (AN/AAQ-28) 
6 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) 
4 Net-Centric Ops 
4 ALR-67 RWR Systems 
3 ALR-67 Advanced Special Receiver 
2 PRISM 
3 Fast Tactical Imagery II 
2 Tactical Aircraft Moving Map Capability (TAMMAC) 
Table 13.   Number of Navy Budget Requests Across Presidents’ Budgets, FY1998–
FY2013 
Of the 24 Navy upgrade efforts, two were budgeted to impact all series of the 
F/A-18 (A/B/C/D/E/F).  The core avionics upgrade was requested in FY2005, followed 
by the Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) in FY2007 (see Table 14). 
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Series Effort Budget Year 
A/B/C/D/E/F Core Avionics Upgrades 2005 
A/B/C/D/E/F AESA 2007 
Table 14.   Efforts Spanning all Series of F/A-18 Blocks, FY1998–FY 2013 
Four efforts captured the early series aircraft (A/B) with the budget requests in 




A/B/C/D GPS 1998 
A/B/C/D Common Configuration 1998 
A U.S. Marine Corps Avionics Upgrade 1999 
A/D Litening (AN/AAQ-28) 2005 
Table 15.   Efforts Incorporating the Early Series of the F/A-18 (A/B/C/D) 
Twelve efforts included the mid-block aircraft (C/D) and were included in 
FY1998, FY2000, FY2001, FY2002, and FY2009 (see Table 16). 
Series Effort Budget Year 
C/D Digital Communications System 1998 
C/D Positive ID System 1998 
C/D AN/APG-73 Radar Upgrade 1998 
C/D 
AN/ARC-210 Electronic Protection Comb 
Radio 1998 
C Advanced Tactical Airborne Recon System 1998 
C/D ALR-67 Advanced Special Receiver 1998 
C/D Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System 2000 
C/D ATFLIR 2000 
C/D AIM-9X Compatibility 2001 
C/D TAMMAC 2001 
C/D Mk XIIA Mode 5 IFF 2002 
C/D ALR-67 RWR Systems 2009 
Table 16.   Efforts Focusing on Mid Series (C/D) 
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And the latter series F/A-18 aircraft (E/F/G) were captured by requests in 
FY2005, FY2006, and FY2009 (see Table 17). 
Series Effort Budget Year 
E/F/G Link 4A Replacement 2005 
E/F AESA 2006 
E/F Net Centric Ops 2009 
Table 17.   Efforts Focusing on the Latter Series (E/F/G) 
Figure 8 graphically depicts the top six recurring modification requests in terms of 
number of times requested over the period of time included in my research (FY1998–
FY2013).  Table 18 provides additional insight into the annual budget requests, showing 
which modifications were requested for airframes over the years. 
In both Figures 6 and 8, it is interesting to note the recurrence of the modification 
requests.  Beyond question, the program offices for the F-16 and F/A-18 are working 
hard to continuously deliver upgraded products to the warfighter.  But with such a 
constant repetition of modifications, the question needs to be asked whether they are 
receiving the financial support needed to achieve efficient upgrades.  It is hard to 
correlate efficient modifications with budget requests that drag out over a decade.  Are all 
aircraft and aircrews equally reaping the intended benefits of the collective upgrades?  I 
contend that the piecemeal budgetary requests for modifications highlights a systemic 
challenge in the bureaucracy of government funding, which in itself forces each program 
office to operate with extreme inefficiency.  But they do so very well as they have no 
other choice. 
The concept of the Defense Acquisition Management Acquisition Retrieval 
system (DAMIR; http://www.acq.osd.mil/damir/) is great, but, unfortunately, seems to be 
falling short of its potential.  The message on its front page reads as follows: 
DAMIR is a DoD initiative that provides enterprise visibility to 
Acquisition program information. DAMIR streamlines acquisition 
management and oversight by leveraging web services, authoritative data 
sources, data collection, and data repository capabilities. DAMIR 
identifies various data sources that the Acquisition community uses to 
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manage Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) and Major 
Automated Information Systems (MAIS) programs and provides a unified 
web-based interface through which to present that information. DAMIR is 
the authoritative source for Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR), SAR 
Baseline, Acquisition Program Baselines (APB), and Assessments. It is a 
powerful reporting and analysis tool with robust data checks, validation, 
standardization and workflow leveling. It has extensive security 
capabilities as well as both classified and unclassified versions. One 
component of DAMIR, Purview, is an executive information system that 
displays program information such as mission and description, cost, 
funding and schedule. It is OSD’s solution for structured acquisition data 
presentation and uses web services to obtain and display Defense 
Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) data directly from the Service 
acquisition databases.  
As of June 2013, this statement had last been updated on October 4, 2011.  While there 
are several interesting and useful links on the site, there are also several outdated 
documents that serve to undermine the credibility of the site as a whole.  Perhaps an 
additional link could be made within DAMIR that sheds light specifically on the concept 
I present in this research by showing a trend in the types of modifications requested along 





Figure 8.   Top Six Recurring F/A-18 Modification Requests 
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Table 18.   APN-5 Modification Request Data From FY 1998 to FY 2013 
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Figure 9 shows the trends in costs associated with the USN budget requests for 
modifications and procurement.  As with Figure 7, two trend lines are depicted.  The 
curve that shows a decreasing trend corresponds with a decrease in costs for all 
Department of the Navy aircraft modifications (APN-5) as a percentage of all Navy 
aircraft procurement (APN-1).  The curve that shows a slight increasing trend denotes the 
cost of all F/A-18 aircraft modifications as a percentage of the all Navy aircraft 
modifications.  The peak of F/A-18 modification requests were between 2003 and 2006. 
 
Figure 9.   Trends in Navy Modification Costs 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
For both the Air Force and the Navy, the archived budget submissions included 
details and justification in support of all aircraft appropriations, but this project hones in 
on the data captured specifically within the Air Force F-16 BP-11 and the Navy F/A-18 
APN-5 because they are both intended to capture modifications.  I specifically avoided 
inclusion of APN-1 or BP-10 (procurement funding) because the intent of those 
categories is to capture the procurement of production-line aircraft.  However, 
discounting both APN-1 and BP-10 also disregards budget requests for any modifications 
that are simultaneously implemented on production-line assets and retrofitted on the 
previously delivered fleet aircraft.  It is legal to absorb APN-5 and BP-11 requirements 
within the procurement funding.  The separation of funds is an important point to 
consider in any follow-on research.  This concept alone warrants its own study to 
understand how much of the fleet is modified with procurement funds.  Left unchecked, 
this funding strategy may prove to be a slippery slope and compromise overall program 
success.  It is very feasible that as a production line comes to a close, any program 
relying on the procurement funds for modification as well as production may find itself 
instantly operating in a deficit status and unable to adequately continue planned 
modifications either in support of capability enhancements or for necessary rework. 
Additionally narrowing the focus, I considered only one type/model of airframe 
for Air Force and Navy aircraft.  However, it is important to highlight that U.S. Marine 
Corps assets are captured as a subset of the DoN, hence the inclusion of the Marine Corps 
F/A-18 within the subset of naval aircraft (although not specifically called out). 
I recommend additional research to further delineate trends in Presidential budget 
requests.  Specifically, researchers may capture and categorize all requests for individual 
modifications.  Moreover, it is not enough simply to annotate the title of each budgetary 
request.  It is more important to read the actual description of what is to be implemented 
and why.  Through the review of the Presidential budget requests, I learned that several 
titles changed while the descriptions remained the same.  Additionally, along with 
specific airframes, it is important to capture any attempt of a single program office to 
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leverage its purchasing power via an economic order quantity in support of multiple 
airframes.  During the fact finding for this project, I learned, via the Navy budget 
archives, that this practice was becoming more popular annually and could very well 
impact any resulting compilation of data.  Specifically, within Naval Aviation Systems 
Command, there are program offices dedicated to the procurement of common equipment 
(PMA-202 Aircrew Systems, PMA-260 Common Ground Support Equipment and 
Automatic Test Equipment, and PMA-209 Common Avionics).  In addition, my research 
has found that between fiscal years 1998 and 2013, the U.S. Navy spent $1.9 billion on 
common avionics upgrades alone.  This is in addition to other aircraft modifications 
listed within BA-5. 
In fiscal years 2003–2006, ASN (RD&A) commissioned a series of reports to 
provide analysis of economic order quantity (EOQ) at the airframe level.  Individual 
program data were submitted via a common single source price investment model 
database that was accessible online.  The data facilitated the generation of standard quad 
charts that detailed such information as the minimum per-unit cost for a given EOQ and 
the maximum per-unit cost per EOQ, both of which are compared to the current per-unit 
rate.  In addition, a graph that shows unit cost as a function of quantity ordered denoted 
zones of “inefficiency,” “efficiency,” and “diminishing returns.”  As a result of the 
continually requested upgrades, I propose that a similar analysis be ongoing for the wide 
variety of recurring subsystems.  Regardless of service affiliation, there simply has to be 
a better way to strengthen the overall buying power across the board within the DoD (and 
perhaps the federal government).  Moreover, the concept of a program office that is 
charged with making common purchases (e.g., PMA-260, Common Aviation Support 
Equipment) might well be expanded to a DoD-wide level.  A military clearinghouse for 
all issues of GPS (for example) or Beyond Line-of-Sight Radios could serve to enhance a 
ready and consistent production base, and ultimately a quicker turnaround on desired 
platform upgrades.  It is a disservice for any program office to feel compelled to request 
the same type of upgrade for a decade.  At that pace, the latest retrofit is most assuredly 
different that the first installation.  With the implementation of a common subsystem 
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acquisition office, resources across DoD program offices would regain much-needed 
bandwidth in order to address a variety of competing issues. 
Lastly, in concert with follow-on, higher fidelity analysis of what program offices 
have requested and continue to request for a budget, a breakdown of the various 
engineering change proposals (ECPs, often submitted en masse) might prove to offer 
insight into what levels of efficiency exist at the program (and integrated product team 
[IPT]) level.  Without any specific examples, I saw an enormous number of ECPs that 
were included in the Presidential budget request on a recurring basis.  Considering our 
current fiscal environment and the pending reduction of manpower, it is valid to ask 
whether such a workload is feasible.  The requests for funding such a large, recurring 
quantity of ECPs portray a well-intentioned but unsustainable roadmap.  There are 
undoubtedly extra costs rooted within countless inefficiencies; specifically, the funds 
required to maintain our industry counterpart while the DoD attacks several different 
projects simultaneously, each constantly reprioritized in an effort to focus on the 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 39 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Babb, C. E. (2012, January). Naval Aviation Vision.  Patuxent River, MD: Naval Air 
Systems Command. 
Department of the Air Force. (2012). Appropriation symbols and budget codes FY 2012 
(Air Force Manual 65-605).  Washington, DC: Author. 
Department of the Air Force. (2011). The Air Force roadmap 2011.  Retrieved from 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA471948 
Department of the Air Force. (2006). The Air Force roadmap 2006–2025.  Retrieved 
from http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA471948 
Department of Defense (DoD). (2007a, November 20). The defense acquisition system (DoD 
Directive 5000.01). Washington, DC: Author. 
Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, S. 2515, 107th Cong. 
(2002). Retrieved from http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/s2515  
Department of Defense (DoD). (2006, March). FY2009–2034 unmanned systems 
integrated roadmap.  Washington, DC: Author. 
Department of Defense (DoD). (2007b, December). Unmanned systems roadmap 2007–
2032. Washington, DC: Author. 
Gertler, J. J. (2009). Tactical aircraft modernization: Issues for Congress (CRS Report 
RL33543). Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research 
Services.  
General Accounting Office (GAO). (2001a). Defense acquisitions: Navy and Marine 
Corps pilot program initiatives to reduce total ownership costs (GAO-01-675R). 
Washington, DC: Author. 
General Accounting Office (GAO). (2001b). Tactical aircraft: Modernization plans will 
not reduce average age of aircraft (GAO-01-163). Washington, DC: Author. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2007). Tactical aircraft: DOD needs a joint 
and  integrated  investment strategy (GAO-07-415). Washington, DC: Author.  
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2010). Defense acquisitions: Assessments of 
selected major weapon programs (GAO-10-388SP). Washington, DC: Author.  
 40 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2012). Defense acquisitions: Assessments of 
selected major weapon programs (GAO-12-400SP). Washington, DC: Author.  
Helper. Fred (2009). Navy Performance Based Logistics (PBL) Success….The F/A-18 
and EA-18G Program—Capable, Affordable & Interoperable…Today & 
Tomorrow.  Presentation for Defense Acquisition University South Region 5th 
Annual Conference & Expo, Feb. 18, 2009 
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R. 5122, 109th 
Cong. (2006). Retrieved from http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/hr5122 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, H.R. 1588, 108th Cong. 
(2003). Retrieved from http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/108/hr1588 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.R. 2647, 111th Cong. 
(2009).  Retrieved from http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr2647  
Roberts, J. R. (2011).  Budget exhibits (Defense Acquisition University teaching note).  




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
